IBPS-PO 2018 Day-6
Syllogism: Practice as much as you can. This is a scoring topic.Reverse syllogism, new pattern syllogism. Here is one of my subscribed channel. I like the concept. Please check this out and I will post a pdf of syllogism question tomorrow.
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Stay focused!!!
THERE IS NO SHORTCUT TO SUCCESS...
READING COMPREHENSION
Syllogism: Practice as much as you can. This is a scoring topic.Reverse syllogism, new pattern syllogism. Here is one of my subscribed channel. I like the concept. Please check this out and I will post a pdf of syllogism question tomorrow.
CLICK HERE
Stay focused!!!
THERE IS NO SHORTCUT TO SUCCESS...
YOU WILL SHINE- JUST GO FOR IT!!!
Shooter Rani Sarnobat- GOLD!!!
The United
States’ supposed grand strategy to thwart the rampaging Islamic State
(IS) is seemingly in a shambles.
Reports indicate that IS has not only foiled the U.S.-led attacks thus far, but
has also perpetrated massive defeats on the Iraqi army. What’s more, the Syrian
rebel coalitions that were working closest with the U.S. are also apparently
beginning to turn against America. The attacks in Syria against IS — an
extremist Sunni organisation — and Khorasan — a mysterious, and far lesser
known, network began in the middle of September through a series of carefully
planned air strikes; they were, to illustrate the magnitude of the assaults,
the largest single operation by the U.S. military since NATO’s intervention in
Libya in 2011. The on-going acts of aggression on Syrian territory, by many
accounts, might only be the tip of the iceberg. The consequence, however, of a
prolonged battle, analysts say, could backfire miserably on the U.S. It could,
for instance, further strengthen the militantly oppressive regime of the Syrian
President, Bashar al-Assad. But, all of these practicalities apart, what has
been most telling about the American attacks, are the almost-mundane
inevitability of them all. As the journalist Glenn Greenwald observed, it seems
“Empires bomb who they want, when they want, for whatever reason.”
Officially,
although it seems to matter so little, the U.S. has sought to justify its
attacks by invoking Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. “States must be
able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of individual
and collective self-defense … when, as is the case here, the government of the
State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of
its territory for such attacks,” wrote U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha
Power in a letter to the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon. “The Syrian
regime has shown that it cannot and will not confront these safe-havens
effectively itself. Accordingly, the United States has initiated necessary and
proportionate military actions in Syria in order to eliminate the ongoing [IS]
threat to Iraq .…” While the attacks against IS have been sought to be
justified as an act in exercise of collective self-defence of Iraq, the legal
justification offered for strikes on Khorasan is different: those strikes are a
response to what Ms. Power described as “terrorist threats that [Khorasan] pose
to the United States and our partners and allies.” The international law on the
use of force by states is governed both by treaty — the U.N. charter, to which
the U.S. is a founding signatory — and customary law. The latter is a set of
rules that acquire binding status by virtue of extensive practice by a number
of states acting out of a sense of obligation over a sustained period of time.
In this case, Ms. Power’s statements might look like legal justifications, but,
in fact, they are almost completely shorn of reasonable basis under both treaty
and customary law.
Insofar as
treaty law is concerned, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter states that members
shall refrain in their international relations from
“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state .…” Therefore, any armed attack by a state in a
foreign territory is prohibited unless otherwise permitted by the charter. Article
51 of the U.N. Charter represents the general exception to this rule. It
preserves every nation-state’s “inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,”
until the Security Council intervenes. Provided however that any such response
ought to be immediately reported to the Security Council. Here, given that the
Assad government has offered no express authorization to the U.S., the attacks
are, without question, in violation of Syria’s sovereignty. Therefore, the aggressors
ought to necessarily look towards the exceptions to the prohibited use of force
under the U.N. Charter in justifying their actions. The International Court of
Justice (ICJ), as Kevin Jon Heller, a professor of criminal law at The School
of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, has pointed out, has taken a
staunch view on the subject; it has held that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
permits acts in self-defence against non-state actors (such as IS and Khorasan)
only in limited circumstances. In both Nicaragua v. the United
States (1986)
and the Advisory Opinion in the case of the Palestinian Wall (2004), the ICJ
ruled that an action is justifiable under Article 51 only where the non-state
actor’s armed attacks are attributable, in one way or another, to the state
whose territorial integrity is being infracted. In this case, therefore, the
U.S. will have to show that the acts of ISIS, and Khorasan, are attributable —
either explicitly or implicitly — to the Syrian government.
America’s
purported justification for the attacks, flowing from Ms. Power’s letter,
however involves no such analysis. Instead, it merely states that because Syria
is unwilling or unable — it doesn’t tell us which — to prevent the use of its
territory for attacks by IS and Khorasan, the U.S. is justified in invoking its
collective right of self-defence.
The problems with such an explanation are various. First, the “unwilling or unable” test that the U.S. seeks to invoke, as much as it would like us to believe otherwise, has no valid basis in international law. It neither finds any mention in Article 51 nor has it been accepted by a sufficient number of nation-states for it to acquire the status of customary law. As Prof. Heller has observed, international law has evolved tremendously since 9/11, but it may not have changed as much as to justify attacks against non-state actors purely because the host state is unwilling or unable to quell such an actor.
The problems with such an explanation are various. First, the “unwilling or unable” test that the U.S. seeks to invoke, as much as it would like us to believe otherwise, has no valid basis in international law. It neither finds any mention in Article 51 nor has it been accepted by a sufficient number of nation-states for it to acquire the status of customary law. As Prof. Heller has observed, international law has evolved tremendously since 9/11, but it may not have changed as much as to justify attacks against non-state actors purely because the host state is unwilling or unable to quell such an actor.
Second,
even if one were to assume that the “unwilling or unable” test has acquired
legal imprimatur, the attacks by the U.S. in Syrian territory remain on flimsy
ground. Syria has offered no explicit consent for such attacks, and has
certainly not stated that it is either unwilling or unable to counter the
threat of IS. Quite to the contrary, the Syrian Foreign Minister, Walid
al-Muallem, who is also the country’s Deputy Prime Minister, has said, “Any
strike which is not coordinated with the [Syrian] government will be considered
as aggression.” In furtherance of the same statement, Mr. al-Muallem told the
U.N. General Assembly that the attacks by the international community must be
within “the frame of full respect of national sovereignty and in conformity
with international conventions.” These statements, as are self-evident, are
expressions neither of unwillingness nor inability. As the French President
François Hollande put it at a press conference following the U.S.’s
initial air strikes in Syria: “We’re very concerned with the aspects of
international law. We’ve been called in by the Iraqis; we’re not called on in
Syria.”
Third, and
possibly most frighteningly, as Mr. Greenwald has reported, it isn’t merely the
fact that the U.S. has failed to show any evidence of an imminent attack on its
homeland, which is worrying. It is that the Khorasan Group, that the U.S.
originally referenced, might well be a figment of its imagination. Thus far,
America has failed to display any proof that the Khorasan actually exists. To
make matters worse, the White House has also confirmed that a standard that
President Obama announced as part of a supposed U.S. drone policy, which would
see the country launch drone strikes only when there was a “near certainty”
that there would be no civilian casualties, would not apply to air strikes
against IS. Just as it failed to do with Russia’s military intervention in
Ukraine earlier this year, it is quite clear that the international law against
the use of armed force — embodied in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter — has
fallen short of constraining, or even as much as defining, the ongoing attacks
by the U.S. in Syria. It is possible that most civilized nations consider the
American attacks as legitimate and necessary, even if illegal. But, if that
were the case, shouldn’t such illegality matter more when it assaults the very
foundation of our international legal order? And do not these attacks further
negate any semblance of legitimacy that international law still enjoys?
Sovereignty, once upon a time, used to be inviolable. If the lack of a global
uproar against the American intervention in Syria represents a tacit acceptance
of the necessity for these attacks, the question still remains: why is
international law so weak as to be incapable of producing a lawfully tailored
solution to counter the Islamic State’s most gruesome threats, including a
potential genocide of Yazidis?
Asking these questions at a time such
as this might appear, to some, imprudent. But it is important for countries
that often seek to occupy a moral high ground when other countries indulge in
illegal military interventions to set good examples. Maintaining a workable
international legal order requires the most powerful countries to set the
correct precedent; if the U.S. is indeed justified in using force in Syria,
then it ought to offer a legally tenable defence for its participation in the
conflict. When Barack Obama assumed office as the U.S. President, many believed
that his administration would correct the policies of the disastrous Bush
regime. But the Obama administration might well have created far more dangerous
dogmas, as its vacuous defence of the attacks on Syrian soil shows. If
countries treat these justifications by the U.S. as edicts, the already parlous
state of international law could suffer far greater dents.
Q41. Which among the following explains
the opinion of the author regarding the attack of US in Syria?
(a)
The
author supports the move by US authorities because Syrian authorities have
requested the US to do the same
(b)
The
author thinks that the move by America will set a dangerous precedent for
international law since it is more of an aggression than any help
(c)
US
authorities should have consulted the Syrian government before doing anything
on the soil of the country
(d)
US
authorities have not done anything regarding the problems in Syria
(e)
Other
than those given in options
Q42. Why, among the following, did the
USA attack the Syrian country?
(a)
The
Syrian soli was being confiscated by the IS rebels who were taking control of
the country gradually
(b)
The
Syrian government could not control the Khorasan group which was active in the
country
(c)
The
Syrian government could not take care of its citizens in the country in order
to protect them from the rebels
(d)
Both
(1) and (2)
(e)
All
the above
Q43. Which among the following is a
justification given by the US government with respect to its attacks on Syrian
soil?
(a)
US
Government is a military superpower and it has moral obligation to save all the
countries of the world
(b)
The
US authorities are of the view that every other country of the world needs to
be protected from the rebels
(c)
US
government is the most concerned country regarding protection of human rights
in the world
(d)
US
Government needed to step in since the Syrian government could not protect its
own citizens
(e)
Other
than those given in options
Q44. Which among the following could be
a negative effect of the attacks of the US government on Syrian soil, according
to the given passage?
(a)
The
US government will lose a lot of its military power because of this attack and
it will not be able to defend itself from other countries in the future
(b)
The
US government can strengthen the stronghold of the aggressor government in
Syria
(c)
The
US government can weaken the capability of the Syrian Army because of no use of
force by it
(d)
The
US government could face backlash from the US president because of no
permission taken from it
(e)
Other
than those given in options
Q45. Which among the following may
justify the attack on Syrian soil by the US Army as per the UN Charter on the
subject of international law?
(a)
US
should have taken the permission of Syrian government before attacking the
country from outside
(b)
US
should have done some homework against the IS group before attacking the Syrian
government on the issue
(c)
The
US government should have found a way to show that the attacks are actually
sponsored and administered by the Syrian government
(d)
The
US government should let its army do whatever it deems fit in the present
circumstances
(e)
Other
than those given in options
Q46. Which among the following is true
regarding the US strikes in Syrian against the non state actors functioning out
of the Syrian soil?
(a)
US strikes have no backing from the government
of the country in which it is carrying out such strikes
(b)
US
Government knows that it is doing something wrong and that is why, it has not
bothered to give any explanation for the same
(c)
US
government is well aware of the fact that ISIS does not need Syria to blossom
as it has nothing to do with state aggression
(d)
Both
(1) and (2)
(e)
All
of the above
Q47. Which among the following is similar
in meaning to the word thwart as used in the passage?
(a)
Extrovert
(b)
Intervene
(c)
Exacerbate
(d)
Calibrate
(e)
Prevent
Q48. Which among the following is
similar in meaning to the word shambles as used in the passage?
(a)
Muddle
(b)
Organization
(c)
Satisfaction
(d)
Utilization
(e)
Other
than those given in options
Q49. Which among the following is
opposite in meaning to the word refrain as used in the passage?
(a)
Cancel
(b)
Cascade
(c)
Erase
(d)
Continue
(e)
Other
than those given in options
Q50. Which among the following is
opposite in meaning to the word quell as used in the passage?
(a)
Aggravate
(b)
Estimate
(c)
Tease
(d)
Cleanse
(e)
Other
than those given in options
